In Jones and others v United Kingdom (2014), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that granting immunity from jurisdiction to State officials in civil proceedings with respect to torture was not a violation of Article 6 ECHR. This is an unfortunate decision, as its application will often result in an accountability vacuum, as victims of torture may not have reasonable access to remedies in the State where they were tortured. Only bystander States, or their State of nationality could then offer relief by offering a forum. A proper avenue for such States is to make the exercise of jurisdiction and the conferral of immunity dependent on whether or not the territorial State offers an adequate forum for dispute-settlement. By further developing these principles, the notion that, under international law, persons are individually accountable for international crimes and should not be allowed to hide behind the State on whose behalf they act, could be finally realised.
There was, however, little to no precedent regarding the (related) question as to whether State officials, such as the Saudi Arabian officials sued in Jones, could also avail themselves of the immunity of the State with regards to acts of torture in civil proceedings brought against them.
In criminal proceedings, such immunity has at times been lifted, notably by the UK House of Lords in the Pinochet case 4 , but this case-law has not gone unopposed. For instance, Roman Kolodkin, Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission on the immunity of officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, held that the various rationales for exceptions to the immunity of officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction (in respect of international crimes) prove upon close scrutiny to be insufficiently convincing. 5 By and large, however, after Pinochet, the defense of State official immunity has hardly been advanced in criminal proceedings brought under the universality principle, perhaps reflecting the international values that are protected under this principle.
While, accordingly, there is some practice abrogating State official immunity in criminal proceedings regarding international crimes, there is hardly any such practice with respect to civil proceedings, for the simple reason that civil proceedings in respect of international crimes have hardly been brought against foreign State officials. This is explained by the fact that under domestic rules of judicial jurisdiction, forum States cannot normally entertain jurisdiction over acts performed by foreigners outside the forum State. As the ECtHR pointed out in Jones, none of the member States of the Council of Europe, except for the UK, had considered the specific situation of State officials. As a result, the former's responses were 'largely hypothetical and analytical, rather than evidence-based.' Under English law, however, English courts can exercise jurisdiction over such cases, although a substantial number of them may be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. 6 The legal discussion in Jones did not focus on the jurisdictional issue, however, 7 but on the immunity question. Nevertheless, the question of jurisdiction conspicuously informed the immunity determination: the ECtHR pointed out that the UN Torture Convention does not contain an obligation for States to exercise universal jurisdiction in civil cases and thus that State official immunity could not be abrogated in respect of civil torture claims. In doing so, the ECtHR distinguished Jones from Pinochet. In the criminal case of Pinochet, indeed, the UK House of Lords held that the Torture Convention obliges States to exercise universal criminal jurisdiction over State officials (if they do not extradite the presumed offender), and accordingly that the Convention necessarily abrogates the immunity of State officials. In the ECtHR's view, apparently, in the absence of an obligation to exercise universal jurisdiction, the classic principle that State officials enjoy immunity ratione materiae, ie, immunity for acts done in an official capacity, does not lose its validity. According to the Court, the immunity which is applied against State officials remains State immunity:
'Since an act cannot be carried out by a State itself but only by individuals acting on the State's behalf, where immunity can be invoked by the State then the starting point must be that immunity ratione materiae applies to the acts of State officials. If it were otherwise, State immunity could always be circumvented by suing named officials.'
As it did not uncover an exception to this principle, the Court went on to find that '[t]he findings of the House of Lords [in Jones v. Saudi Arabia] were neither manifestly erroneous nor arbitrary', and thus that the Saudi Arabian officials were entitled to immunity from jurisdiction, even in respect of allegations of torture.
It is of note, however, that the Court identified 'some emerging support in favour of a special rule or exception in public international law in cases concerning civil claims for torture lodged against foreign State officials' and that 'this is a matter which needs to be kept under review by Contracting States'. Notably, courts in the United States have held that foreign State officials are not entitled to immunity from jurisdiction in respect of torture: the U.S. Torture Victim Protection Act 1991 provides that ' an individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation … subjects an individual to torture shall, in a 4 civil action, be liable for damages to that individual'. 8 Furthermore, in 2012, a U.S. Court of Appeals found that a former Somali agent did not enjoy immunity in respect of civil claims alleging torture, on the ground that as a matter of international and domestic law, jus cogens violations are, by definition, acts that are not officially authorized by the sovereign. 9 Therefore, it is not excluded that, in due course and in light of evolutions in State practice, a conferral of immunity on State officials with respect to allegations of torture might be considered to violate Art. 6 ECHR. Suffice to say in this respect, however, that even as we write, Jones does not prohibit States from rejecting immunity in civil torture cases brought against foreign State officials. Jones only stands for the principle that States which uphold immunity in such cases do not violate the ECHR.
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The Jones principle may be legally correct, but also most unfortunate, as its application often results in an accountability vacuum. Victims of torture may not have reasonable access to remedies in the State where they were tortured, such as Mr Jones. Only bystander States, or their State of nationality could then offer relief by offering a forum. A proper avenue for such States is to make the exercise of jurisdiction and the conferral of immunity dependent on whether or not the territorial State offers an adequate forum for dispute-settlement. This idea is in fact already part and parcel of the domestic and the ECHR legal systems. The domestic law of a considerable number of States features forum of necessity or forum non conveniens provisions, allowing forum courts to exercise, or as the case may be, decline jurisdiction, dependent on the availability of a local forum. 10 Similarly, the ECtHR conditions domestic courts' granting of immunity to international organizations on the latter thus providing a reasonably available alternative dispute-settlement mechanism.
11
By further developing these principles, the notion that, under international law, persons are individually accountable for international crimes and should not be allowed to hide behind the State on whose behalf they act, could be finally realised. It is reminded that in a criminal context this principle was laid down as early as 1946 by the Nuremberg Tribunal, which famously held that '[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.' 12 It is high time that this principle is also extended to tort law, the deterrent effect of which, in view of the sizable damages civil courts could award, should not be underestimated.
